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A COST ANALYSIS:
RE-ENGINlNG A BOEING 727-200 (ADVANCED)
VERSUS BUYING A NEW BOEING 757-200
Peter B. Coddington

The Boeing 727-200 and 757-200 are both narrowbody aircraft designed for short- to medium-range flights
carrying 164 to 214 passengers. Until recently, when overtaken by the Boeing 737, the 727-200 program was
the most successful aircraft program in history. The 727 airplane has carried 2.3 billion passengers, equivalent
to half the world's population (Sterling, 1992).
More than half of all 727s sold were advanced 200s and as late as 1990 an incredible 50% of all U.S.
passenger traffic had flown on 727-200s since the advanced model was launched in 1971. For several
years it was this plane ... that provided Boeing with its positive cash flow and almost singlehandedly
wiped out the company's debt. (Sterling, 1992, p. 343)
With this kind of achievement, the 727 program was hard to discontinue. (Actually, the 757 program was
originally named the 727-300 program.)
The need for a successor to the 727-200 (advanced) was spurred by the oil crisis of 1973 and by increasing
public demand for noise suppression. The 757 program used only two engines under each wing instead of
the three engines used in the 727. These two engines were not only Stage 3 compliant but also much more
fuel efficient. There are now 497 757-200s operating worldwide while there are still 910 727-200 (advanced)
models operating. A gradual phase-out of the 7278 and phase-in of the 757 could occur over time, but public
outcry over noise at airports around the country has led the government to force airlines to move more
quickly.
THE PROBLEM
The airline industry has been mandated by the
Airport Noise and Capacity Act of November 5, 1990, to
reduce the noise of their fleets. U.S. carriers are required
to decrease their Stage 2 fleet to 45% by 1994,35% by
1996, 25% by 1998, and by 1999 only quieter Stage 3
aircraft will be allowed to land at U.S. airports. Most
European countries have already adopted similar
restrictions, and other geographic regions are following
suit. In addition, many local municipalities and airport
authorities are pushing for noise reduction earlier than
the 1999 deadline. Stage 3 aircraft are those that register
94.7 decibels or less at takeoff and 100.7 decibels or less
when landing.
Noise reduction can be accomplished in one of three
ways. The first is by replacing noisy Stage 2 aircraft with
new, quieter Stage 3 aircraft. The second is by
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retrofitting, or "hushkitting," the existing aircraft. The
third way to reduce aircraft noise is by putting new
engines on the existing airframes, or re-engining. This
study will examine the benefits of re-engining aircraft
versus purchasing new aircraft-specifically, buying a new
Boeing 757-200 or re-engining a used Boeing 727-200
(advanced).
Buying new aircraft to replace the existing fleet is an
expenditure the airline industry cannot easily afford at
present. Due to destructive fare competition, oil price
spikes during the Persian Gulf War, and a depressed
travel market, the U.S. airline industry has lost $10
billion since 1990 (Air Transport Association of
America, 1993). To put this figure in perspective, if one
added all the profitable years the U.S. airline industry
has had since 1945, the cumulative total of profits made
would be just under $10 billion (M. Mistrik, personal
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communication, March 2, 1993). In effect, the past three
years have negated all profits the U.S. airline industry
has earned for almost the last 50 years.
Considering its dismal performance and the scarcity of
capital in the wake of bank failures and global recession,
the airline industry is unlikely to raise the huge amount
of capital necessary to buy new aircraft, much less
replace by 1999 the 43% of its fleet which is presently
Stage 2 (Greene, 1993). Pratt & Whitney claims $130
billion would be needed to replace all Stage 2 aircraft.
The possibility of replacing older aircraft becomes more
remote in light of the $27 billion in aircraft orders that
have been cancelled or deferred since December 1991
(M. Mistrik, personal communication, March 10, 1993).
United, Northwest, Delta, USair, and American have
cancelled and deferred enough orders to force Boeing
Company to layoff 20% of its work force, approximately
28,000 workers, during the next year and to reduce its
rate of production by 35% (Betts, 1993). The production
rate for the 757 will be cut from eight to five per month,
. considerably hampering aircraft replacement ability.
The economic forecasts for the airline industry mirror
the economy as a whole: When the economy picks up,
the airline industry will pick up. Aviation Week and
Space Technology is predicting that the airline industry
will begin to regain earnings in 1998 (Ott, 1993). More
significantly, the airline industry has some internal
problems as a result of self-destructive fare wars. Airlines
operating under Chapter 11 bankruptcy (3 of the 10 U.S.
major carriers in 1992 were operating in bankruptcy) do
not have to make payments to creditors. Without the
requirement of making payments, these bankrupt carriers
can lower their fares to unrealistic levels to attract
travelers. To compete, the healthy carriers lower their
fares, also. The result is an industry losing money.
The situation has reached the point where the U.S.
government is debating the merits of re-regulation. In
fact, President Clinton created a special committee, The
National Commission To Ensure A Strong Competitive
Airline Industry, to offer legislative suggestions which
could save the airline industry. Other elected officials
have recognized the difficulty air carriers will have
complying with new Stage 3 rules. Senator Pressler from
Washington has introduced Bill 8.989 to amend the
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Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990. This bill would
offer government financing to replace Stage 2 aircraft,
but it has just been introduced and must go through the
legislative process. The fact remains that the airline
industry must become Stage 3 compliant, but money for
replacement aircraft is difficult to acquire.
If replacing Stage 2 aircraft with new Stage 3 aircraft
is unfeasible, then the airlines have two options. First,
they can hushkit their existing aircraft, which is initially
the least expensive option, costing between $2 and $3
million. Second, they can re-engine existing aircraft at a
cost of $8-10 million. Hushkitting, while the least
expensive option in upfront costs, actually ends up
costing the airline more in operating costs and flight
performance. Hushkits bum 5-10% more fuel than
original engines and reduce thrust, which cuts range and
lift capabilities (J. B. Hodson, personal communication,
March 3, 1993).
This study assumes that re-engining is a better
alternative than hushkitting and, in some cases, is
preferable to buying a new aircraft. The study compares
buying a new Boeing short/medium range narrowbody,
the 757-200, to re-engining its predecessor, the Boeing
727-200 (advanced). The two aircraft are compared in
three areas: purchasing costs, operating costs, and
range/payload capabilities. This study is limited to an
examination of 727s and 757s built for passenger travel.
Although parts of the study could apply to 727s and 757s
built for cargo, many of these aircraft were configured
differently and would require a different methodology.
PURCHASING COST COMPARISON
Boeing Company does not have a published list of
prices for their new aircraft, and new sales are kept
confidential by Boeing Company and the purchaser.
However, Avitas, an airline consultant, publishes an
Aircraft Blue Book (1992) that quotes new 1992 Boeing
757-200 models as selling for $50.1 million with a
variance of 10%, depending on the deal reached by the
purchaser and Boeing Company. Assuming the buyer
gets the best deal possible, the purchase price would be
$45.1 million. The International Aircraft Price Guide
(1992-1993) claims a price range of $52-60 million for a
new 757. Using a median figure of $56 million from the
International Aircraft Price Guide and averaging that with
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the $45.1 million from the Aircraft Blue Book yields an
average price of $50.6 million. Accordingly, for the
purposes of this study, a new Boeing 757 is assumed to
cost $50.6 million. This model was first manufactured in
1982, and there are currently 270 flying and another 596
on order and option (Lambert, 1990).
The first Boeing 727-200 (advanced) was
manufactured in 1972; the last was delivered in 1983
(cargo models were delivered as late as 1984). A total of
925 were manufactured for passenger travel, 15 of which
have been destroyed. The majority, 589 models, were
manufactured during or after 1978. These models are
considered the most viable candidates for re-engining
since they are between 10- and 15-years-old. Since a
Boeing aircraft has a life expectancy of 25 years (Boeing,
1993), the 589 727s still have 10 to 15 years of service.
The latter value of 15 years is used in this study.
The Aircraft Blue Book (1992) quotes the current
value of the 1978-1983 727 models as $5.6-7.7 million.
The IntemationalAircra[t Price Guide (1992-1993) quotes
prices for the 1978-1983 models as falling between $2.9
and $9.5 million. Taking the average of the two sources,
a 727-200 (advanced) manufactured between 1978-1983
costs $6.4 million.
The cost of re-engining a 727-200 varies, depending
on which company is used and how much extra
refurbishment is completed on the airframe. Only one
company, Valsan Partners, has successfully re-engined a
727-200 (advanced), so the data drawn from that effort
is used to compare the refurbished 727 with the new 757.
However, the Valsan program is not a complete reengining because it replaces only the two outboard
engines while rebuilding, or "hushing," the center engine.
Other companies have announced plans to re-engine the
727. Rolls Royce has successfully re-engined 727-100
models, but has not re-engined any 727-200 models. The
Rolls Royce program is a complete re-engining since all
three engines are replaced with new engines. Rolls Royce
uses the Tay 651 to re-engine 727-1OOs and has been
extremely successful in cutting fuel costs by 18% for
their launch customer, United Parcel Service (K.
Shapiro, personal communication, March 1, 1993). But
the Tay 651 does not supply enough thrust for the 727200. Realizing the potential market for re-engining the
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727-200, Rolls Royce conceptualized the Tay 670, which
supplies 18,000 pounds of thrust, an ample amount to
lift the 727-200. Rolls Royce had been looking for a
launch customer for the Tay 670, but has recently
stopped due to political considerations within the
European community (J. Mathews, personal
communication, February 17, 1993).
Two other companies have also announced
preliminary plans to re-engine the 727: International
Aero Engines (IAE) and Volpar Inc. Both have
programs to transform the 727 from its present triengine configuration to a twin-engine aircraft. The
engine in the tail would be removed, leaving the two
outboard engines which would supply enough thrust to
power the airplane and still cut present fuel burn by 26%
(International Aircraft Price Guide, 1992-1993).
Though the Rolls Royce, IAE, and Volpar programs
show the greatest promise because they replace all the
old engines, the only 727-200 (advanced) models that
have been refurbished are Valsan retrofits which replace
only the two outboard engines and hushkit the tail
engine. While the Valsan program is not a complete reengining, it cuts fuel costs and increases payload and
range. In addition, as stated above, the Valsan re-engined
models offer the only reliable data for comparing a reengined 727-200 with a new 757-200. Valsan has
retrofitted 18 727-200 (advanced) models, has firm orders
for another 52 aircraft, and holds options on 139
potential orders. Forecasts call for re-engining 450 727200s of the 925 that are flying worldwide (Johnson,
1991).
A refurbished 727-200 (advanced) can have up to
three modifications. In the example used in this study, all
three modifications will be completed on the aircraft.
1. The Valsan re-engining program replaces the two
sideboard engines and rebuilds the center engine at a
cost of $8.6 million.
2. The Valsan program puts winglets on the tips of
each wing, thereby cutting fuel costs and increasing flight
performance at a cost of $500,000.
3. Dee Howard and Mytel plan to offer a cockpit
conversion for the 727 for $1 million, reducing the
number of pilots needed from three to two.
The total cost of all three retrofits is $10.1 million.
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Table 1
Average Operating Costs Per Block Hour, Second Quarter, 1992

FLYING OPERATIONS
Crew Costs

$556

$598

$556 (-42)

Fuel and Oil

$610

$756

$627 (-129)

Rentals

$475

$86

$488 (+402)

Insurance

$14

$3

$3

Taxes

$30

$36

$36

$101

$239

$239

$87

$140

MAINTENANCE BURDEN

$123

$243

$243

DEPRECIATION

$210

$109

$109

$41

$42

$42

TOTAL BLOCK HOUR COST

$2,248

$2,252

$2,424

TOTAL BLOCK HOURS

39,362

60,837

33.5

80.25

MAINTENANCE
Airframes
Engines

OTHER

TOTAL AIRCRAFT IN FLEET

Replacing all three engines or turning a 727 into a
twin with new engines is a better example of re-engining,
but such projects have not yet been completed.
Therefore, operating data of this kind can only be
estimated. The Valsan program, part re-engine and part
hushkitting, does supply real operating costs for a
completed refurbishment. Winglets have not yet been
FAA certified; however, a 727-200 so equipped has
logged 130 hours during a test period. These 130 hours
indicate a 5% decrease in fuel consumption (R.
Wagenfeld, personal communication, March 1, 1993).
Two companies plan on converting three-man COCkpits
into two-man: Dee Howard Co. and Mytel North
Western Jet Air Craft in conjunction with Israel Aircraft.
The COCkpit conversion, while it has not yet been
completed on any aircraft, is in the process of FAA
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$80 (-60)

certification. The conversion eliminates some flight
engineers, so the deduction of these salaries, a simple
calculation, will be applied to the study's comparison.
Crew costs, next to fuel costs, are the most expensive;
standardizing all COCkpits to a two-man configuration will
provide significant savings throughout a fleet.
OPERATING COST COMPARISON
The operating costs of the two models can be
compared by Department of Transportation (DOT)
Form 41 data collected by the government. Each U.S.
commercial air carrier that operates aircraft with 60 seats
or more must, by law, submit the operating expenses of
its fleet by model type. Based upon DOT Form 41 data
from the second quarter of 1992, eight major U.S.
carriers reported their operating costs for the 727-200,
and six major carriers reported their operating costs for
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the 757-200. For the purposes of this study, the average
of all reporting carriers rather than each individual
carrier will be used, although the choice to re-engine or
buy new is best suited to an individual operator's route
requirements. These average operating costs per block
hour are adjusted and used as a basis for comparing the
re-engined 727 and the new 757 (see Table 1). However,
the new operating costs for the re-engined 727-200 must
be calculated first.
DOT FORM 41 ADJUSTMENTS
FOR A RE-ENGINED 727
A refurbished 727-200 will change the following DOT
Form 41 line items: crew costs, fuel and oil, rentals, and
maintenance.
The crew costs of a refurbished 727-200 are based on
the $1 million cockpit renovation that eliminates the
flight engineer as the third crew member in the cockpit.
A flight engineer can cost an airline an average of
$65,000 a year to employ, depending on salary
scale, allowances, and training costs. Depending on
the route systems and duty restrictions, an airline
can expect to employ between four and five flight
engineers per aircraft. This translates to an annual
cost of between $260,000 and $325,000 a year per
aircraft. (Williams, 1992)
Assuming a median annual cost of $292,500, it would
take 3.4 years to payoff the $1 million investment to
retrofit the cockpit. Considering that a re-engined 727
has 15 years of service after refurbishment, the
investment is worthwhile. The conversion makes the 727
cockpit identical to the two-man 757 configuration. Since
the refurbished cockpit will also use two pilots instead of
three, the crew costs are assumed to be the same as for
the 757 (see Table 1).
Fuel and oil costs are reduced on the refurbished 727200 for two reasons: the two new outboard engines bum
less fuel, and the winglets save another 5% on fuel. The
two new outboard engines are Pratt & Whitney JT8D217C engines, replacing the old JT8D-15s on the 727s.
The Valsan program does not re-engine the tail engine;
Valsan only hushkits it by removing the thrust reverser
and replacing it with an acoustical tailpipe. The Valsan
re-engining on the 727-200 (advanced) has cut fuel costs
by 12% (Valsan, 1992). Combining this 12% with the 5%
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fuel savings from the winglets, there is a 17% reduction
in fuel costs, or a $128.52 reduction for the fuel and oil
line item on the DOT Form 41 operating expense chart
(see Table 1). However, a twin-engine aircraft, the 757200, will be more fuel efficient than a tri-engine aircraft
(727-200).
The cost of maintaining a refurbished 727 should be
less than that required to maintain the original because
the two outboard engines are new and the tail engine is
rebuilt. First-year maintenance is $60 less per flight hour
on the refurbished Valsan 727-200s (Williams, 1992).
The rental line item on the DOT Form 41 data covers
any lease or mortgage payments the operator makes on
the aircraft. This line item can vary considerably
depending on whether the operator is leasing the
aircraft, owns it, or is paying on a loan. Regardless of
how the operator pays for the capital expense of the
aircraft, this line item will increase because of the extra
$10.1 million needed to refurbish the aircraft. The
following loan agreement is assumed for this study: The
loan will be made at a 10% rate of interest, the operator
will make a down payment of 10%, and the loan term
will be for the expected life of the refurbished 727, 15
years. For the purpose of calculating the rental price per
block hour, it is assumed that the 727 has an average
utilization of eight block hours per day, or 2,920 block
hours per year. Considering these assumptions, the yearly
payment for the refurbished 727 would be $1,173,468.
Based on an annual utilization of 2,920 block hours, the
rental for a newly refurbished 727 would be $402 per
block hour (see Table 1).
Before re-engining, the 727 is only $4 more expensive
to operate per block hour than the 757. After
refurbishment, the 727 is $176 more expensive to operate
per block hour than the 757, which represents an 8%
cost increase.
TOTAL FINANCIAL (OPERATING AND
PURCHASING) COSTS COMPARED
Although the 727 is more expensive to operate, its
purchasing cost is so low that it is less expensive to buy
and operate than a new 757 for the first year and for the
next 15 years. Still, the refurbished 727 will incur an
additional cost during its IS-year life. The FAA's
initiative on aging aircraft has created the Supplemental
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Table 2
757n27 Purchasing and Operating Cost Comparison

Purchasing Costs

$50.6

$6.4
$10.1

Refurbishment Costs
Operating Costs

$6.6

$7.1

TOTAL COSTS

$57.2

$23.6*

* If 727 is already owned, the total is $17.2

Purchasing Costs

$50.6

Refurbishment Costs
Operating Costs

$99.0

SSID Compliance Costs
TOTAL COSTS

$149.6

*If 727 is already owned, the total is $116.9

Structural Inspection Directive (SSID), which requires a
major overhaul of all aircraft with more than 60,000
cycles (one takeoff and one landing). All 727s 20 years or
older will reach 60,000 cycles, resulting in an SSID cost
of$800,OOO (P. Viola, personal communication, February
24, 1993).
Using the same annual utilization rate of 2,920 block
hours, Table 2 shows how much it will cost to fly the two
models the first year, and how much it will cost to fly the
two models over a IS-year period.
In both cases, the refurbished 727 is a less expensive
option. However, a new 757 is likely to have a longer
lifespan than 15 years, while a refurbished 727 is not
likely to last more than 15 years. Considering the present
economic condition of the airline industry, the first-year
saving is especially attractive. If an airline already owns

a 727, the to~al cost to operate and modify the existing
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aircraft is only $17.2 million. If, on the
other hand, an airline operator
scrapped its existing 727 for a new 757,
the cost for the first year would be
$57.2 million-a difference of $40
million. Even over a 15-year period, an
operator who already owns a 727 and
refurbishes it is going to save $32.7
million over buying a new 757.
Considering that the 10 major U.S.
airlines have a combined 463 727-2005
in service ("Aircraft Inventories
Worldwide," 1993), and their current
economic condition is not strong, reengining could be the only
economically feasible option.

RANGE AND PASSENGER
CAPABW1Y COMPARISONS
$10.1
Cost is not the only important factor
to
an
airline. The aircraft must be able
$106.5
to perform a set of tasks according to
$0.8
an operator's route requirements. Each
operator would have to make its own
$123.3*
comparisons based on the range and
payload requirements within its
particular route structure. This study is
limited to a comparison of the range of
the refurbished 727 to the range of the 757 as measured
in nautical miles. Payload, measured in terms of seats,
can be altered to improve range in the sense that seats
can be sacrificed for fuel storage. Also, range can vary
depending on how many of the seats are full, affecting
the weight of the aircraft. For purposes of comparison,
each aircraft is assumed to have a fuel supply of 59,000
pounds of fuel. Under these conditions, the refurbished
727 can travel 2,300 nautical miles (nm) with 165
passengers (W. Johnson, personal communication, March
10, 1993). Under the same conditions, a 757 can travel
3,800 DID with 177 passengers. Therefore, the 757 can
travel 1,500 nm farther with 12 more passengers.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Table 3 provides a final comparison of the two models
in costs and range/passenger load.
In conclusion, for the next IS-year period, a

$6.4
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Table 3
757n27 Cost versus RangelPassengers

."!:!:::·!!l·:i!!i::·::!·::::::!!!:·:i!:!·!:.!!·:~:·~~l!i!lijli!!if:.11I1!1:·!!:.!!i!!!1!1::!::·::I!!1!!
Cost

Range

Passengers

757

$57.2

3,800 nm

165

727

$23.6

2,300 nm

177

Difference

$33.6

1,500 nm

12

::::::·:i!::·::::i::::::::·:·:.i:·.i:!!!::!.··!!~:l!:(~t:·_\II·:li!!lijl):!!:·::·:·:·l!!!:::llll:·l·.:l!::!!:
757

$149.6

3,800 nm

165

727

$123.3

2,300 nm

177

$26.3

1,500 nm

12

Difference

refurbished 727 will be less expensive to purchase and
operate than a new 757, but the 757 will have more
range and payload capabilities. Considering the current
economic condition of the U.S. airline industry (3 of the
10 U.S. major airlines are operating under bankruptcy
protection), a refurbished 727 is an attractive option.
This option is even more attractive when an airline
considers the immediacy of the Stage 3 compliancy, its
current financial condition, and the comparisons in costs
between refurbishment and buying new for the first year
(a difference of $40 million).
However, this savings must be weighed against an
individual air carrier's need for range and payload in its
route structure. The 757 does have more range and
slightly more seats. Also, while outside the assumptions
of this study, a new 757 will last longer than 15 years,
while a refurbished 727 is unlikely to last any longer
than 15 additional years. In a perfect world, a new 757
would be the best option for an airline that needs to
remove Stage 2 727s. However, considering both the
immediacy of compliance to Stage 3 laws (six months

until the first phase in 1994) and the current dismal
economic situation in the airline industry, the
refurbished 727 may be the next best, and only practical,
option to a brand-new aircraft.
Politicians representing angry citizens have forced the
government to enact the Airport Noise and Capacity
Act. Airlines are being forced by federal law to quiet
their fleets from a Stage 2 to a Stage 3 level. The
airlines are in the worst economic condition in the
history of the industry. How can they comply when they
cannot afford replacement aircraft? How can the
airlines afford to convert their aircraft in the next six
months to six years when the majority of their fleets are
Stage 2? The airlines must look to less expensive
options such as re-engining for alleviating the noise
problem such as re-engining.
Perhaps not all 463 727-200 (advanced) models in
service will be refurbished to Stage 3 compliancy. Some
may be replaced by new 757s, but the industry cannot by
any means replace all 463 727-200s with new 757-200s in
six years. The Boeing Company has conceded the fact
that not all 727-200s will be replaced and has cut
production back to five new 757-200s per month. That
means, excluding delays and cancelled orders, Boeing will
manufacture only 360 new 757-200s over the next six
years. That is 103 aircraft short of replacing the existing
727-200 fleet without factoring in the need for additional
aircraft to supply growing markets in the Far East and
Latin America. Excluding inflation, the total cost of
replacing the existing 727 fleet would be $231.5 billion.
Considering that the industry has lost $10 billion in the
last three years, raising $231.5 billion in capital in the
next six years seems very unlikely. In conclusion, taking
into account the present economic landscape and the
immediacy of the mandated noise suppression of the
727s, refurbishing a 727-200 (advanced) is the only
feasible option to buying a new 757-200.Cl
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